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When the federal government began the first public assistance programs
in the 1930s, the goal of such programs was to help those least able to
help themselves—the elderly, the disabled, and widows with childre n .
As the list of those eligible for assistance and the programs available to
them grew, the American public began to feel that for many welfare had
become a way of life rather than a safety net to sustain them temporarily
between jobs or when the family wage earner died. The Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, which
became law in  1996, attempts to end welfare dependency. It ends AFDC
as an entitlement program and replaces it with federal block grants to
states. It allows states greater flexibility in determining benefit levels and
eligibility and encourages them to move people from welfare to work. 
Supporters of the new law argue it will not only be more successful than
the old system in moving people from welfare to work, but it will also
reduce the federal government’s welfare costs. Resident Scholar Oren M.
L e v i n - Waldman questions these arguments in this Public Policy Brief.
He notes that states already had flexibility under the old welfare system,
which allowed them to apply for waivers to run experimental welfare
p rograms. Three states in  particular—Massachusetts, Minnesota, and
Wisconsin—developed relatively successful work-based programs. But
these programs are not inexpensive. If states take seriously the goal of
moving welfare recipients into the workforce, the costs of their welfare
p rograms are likely to increase rather than decrease. Since one of the
goals of the Personal Responsibility Act is to cut welfare spending, it is
doubtful that the federal government or many states will opt to raise
spending to the levels necessary to run successful welfare - t o - w o r k
programs. 
Not only does the new welfare law fall short in funding welfare-to-work
programs, it also fails to end the distinction between welfare and work-
force development. The stigma of being on welfare makes it difficult for
recipients to find employment. Employers are reluctant to hire welfare
recipients because they view them as lazy or untrustworthy employees. If
states are to develop successful welfare-to-work programs, they must
eliminate the stigma associated with welfare.
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comprehensive employment policy.
• We l f a re and unemployment agencies should be merged into one
employment agency. Since welfare recipients and the regular unem-
ployed need similar services to move them into the workforce, there
is little justification for keeping the two groups separate.
• Employment programs should focus on job search assistance and
training.
• Subsidies should be made available to employers to hire welfare
recipients, but the subsidies should be tied to on-the-job training
requirements.
Adopting these suggestions and others discussed in this brief will cost
m o re than is currently spent on welfare, but they will provide gre a t e r
benefits in the long run. Welfare recipients will be able to move into the
w o r k f o rce and support themselves and the American labor force as a
whole will be better trained and more skilled.  
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Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 will be more successful
than the old system in moving welfare recipients into the workforce is
not yet known. States have just begun to implement the changes and it
will be some time before their effects are seen. Supporters of the new
system argue that it will push into the workforce those who have made
welfare a way of life. In other words, these individuals will be required to
take responsibility for their own lives. Opponents of the new system
argue it is likely to push more people, especially children, into poverty
because there are few jobs available for which welfare recipients qualify
and those jobs for which they do qualify do not pay enough to lift
workers out of poverty. Supporters of welfare reform counter that if lack
of job skills is the employment barrier for welfare recipients, training will
overcome that hurdle. 
While re s e a rch indicates that job training can be beneficial, Ore n
L e v i n - Waldman has re s e rvations about whether states will pro v i d e
needed training under the new welfare system. Supporters of decentral-
ization argue that when states are responsible for running pro g r a m s ,
there will be greater experimentation and therefore an increased likeli-
h o od that successful programs will be developed. But Levin-Wa l d m a n
points out there is also an increased chance that many states may choose
to do the least possible under the law for welfare recipients. Successful
welfare-to-work programs are not inexpensive, which might discourage
many states, especially poorer ones, from adopting meaningful work
programs. 
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Lack of job skills is not the only problem welfare recipients face in
finding employment. Levin-Waldman argues that employers have been
reluctant to hire welfare recipients because of preconceived notions
regarding the work habits and abilities of such individuals. The stigma
attached to welfare makes it difficult for recipients to find employment
even when they have received job training. 
These two barriers to employment—lack of job skills and the welfare
stigma—can both be addressed under the new welfare system. Although
it does make it possible for states to decrease their support for welfare
programs, it also offers them the opportunity to devise programs suited to
their needs and to increase their commitment to workforce develop-
ment. Because this opportunity for change exists, the ideas pre s e n t e d
here by Levin-Waldman are an important contribution to the ongoing
debate over welfare reform. He proposes policies that address the prob-
lems of job training and the welfare stigma that states might find useful
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The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act,
perhaps the most sweeping welfare reform since the initial adoption of
public assistance programs in 1935, became law during the summer of
1996. The new welfare imposes cumulative time limits, requires recipi-
ents to participate in work programs, reduces funding for food stamps by
$28 billion over the next six years, and denies assistance to legal immi-
grants for at least five years.* But the new law’s most radical aspect is
that it puts an end to welfare’s entitlement status, puts an end to its guar-
antee of national funding, and subjects it to the annual appropriations
p rocess. It does so by eliminating the old Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) program, a federal entitlement, and
offering the federal portion of AFDC spending to the states in the form
of block grants. Although federal funding to the states for temporary
assistance is to be increased in the short term, the state spending require-
ment is to be reduced by 20 percent.
The new law represents a major step in the direction of welfare reform,
but it contains, nonetheless, any number of flaws. There f o re, it is my
purpose in this brief to offer recommendations for improving on those
re f o rm measures already adopted. One path for improvement might be
simply to appropriate more money in areas that are deficient. Another
path might consist of incentives to businesses to hire people presently on
w e l f a re. It is highly unlikely that Congress will increase spending if it
believes that doing so will allow people to sit on welfare as they have in
the past, but there is room to improve the law within the confines of the
The New We l f a re and the Potential
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a path that takes them into the labor market and keeps them there .
Inevitably, this idea leads to a whole new way of thinking about welfare:
replacing the present welfare system with one that merges existing
w e l f a re and employment bureaucracies in order to achieve a more
coherent and comprehensive employment policy.
The principal reason welfare needed to be re f o rmed, aside fro m
economic considerations of eff i c i e n c y, was that to most people it
a p p e a red to be at odds with core American values. Those values, to
which the new law appeals, are work and self-sufficiency. However, the
new system, if it is to be successful in helping welfare recipients become
s e l f - s u fficient, would ultimately re q u i re more spending. The new law
falls considerably short of appropriating what would likely be needed. If
society wants to provide welfare at the lowest possible cost, it might be
better to retain the old system. But, the old system runs contrary to
fundamental tenets in the American political tradition. Americans,
historically, have believed that individuals should provide for themselves
and should seek public assistance only after they have exhausted all
possible alternatives. At a minimum, they should exhaust all personal
resources before requesting assistance from others. While Americans, in
recent years, have been willing to offer a helping hand, they first want to
see that those in need are at least willing to help themselves (Heclo
1986; Cook and Barrett 1992). The demand that the poor work stems
not from a desire to punish them, but from a core conviction that partic-
ipation in American society’s common project is ultimately the essence
of what it means to be a citizen of the American polity (Mead 1986;
Shklar 1991). And it is through work that the individual participates in
the common project (Levin-Waldman 1996b). Through its elimination
of entitlement status and its emphasis on work re q u i rements, the new
law appeals, in a theoretical sense, to values underpinning American
public philosophy. However, it does not do enough to realize them.
In this brief I argue that to realize the goals of work and self-sufficiency
involves no less than breaking down bureaucratic distinctions between
what have traditionally been re f e rred to as welfare programs and what
a re often re f e rred to as employment programs. The opportunity this
legislation offers to the states to create employment programs is an
o p p o rtunity they should seize to streamline and integrate pro g r a m s
A New Path from Welfare to Work
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Welfare needs to be replaced with a meaningful program of employment
that would end the artificial distinction between welfare assistance and
unemployment insurance. Without a doubt, there is much wrong with
the new law, but its flaws should not obscure its potential to develop
cooperative partnerships between the public and private sectors. Because
the new law re q u i res more recipients to enter the labor market, the
public sector will find it necessary to find ways in which it, along with
the private sector, can create the job opportunities to absorb them. More
c o m p rehensive employment programs might cost the nation more
money in the short term, but they will be worth it in the long term if the
result is a better set of institutional stru c t u res that add vitality to the
labor market. There is no way around the fact that if we as a society
want to reform welfare in a meaningful way, we will to have to pay for it.
The New We l f a re
Under the new welfare the entitlement status enjoyed by the AFDC
system no longer exists. Instead, Congress will allocate block grants to
the states to establish welfare programs that best meet their needs, and
appropriations will be subject to the annual appropriations process. No
longer are individuals entitled to welfare simply because they meet
c e rtain eligibility criteria. Recipients are now re q u i red to become self-
sufficient. After two years they must participate in work programs, and
they may not collect benefits for more than five years in their lifetime.
Although the new law does afford the states greater flexibility in devel-
oping programs that best meet their own needs, it does not completely
do away with the restrictions characteristic of the AFDC system. In
o rder to receive their block grants, states must still follow an array of
federal regulations and must report annually on their progress in imple-
menting programs. The basic regulations are: 
• States are to re q u i re welfare parents to participate in community 
s e rvice employment. The minimum weekly hours and tasks can 
be defined by the states.
• States are re q u i red to operate programs to enforce paternal child 
support.
The New We l f a re and the Potential for Wo r k f o rce Development
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b i rths. States that devise successful programs will be eligible for
bonuses of $20 million to $25 million.
• In order to receive their grants, states must impose mandatory work
re q u i rements and achieve minimum participation rates for single-
p a rent families according to the following schedule: 25 percent in
1997, 30 percent in 1998, 35 percent in 1999, 40 percent in 2000, 45
p e rcent in 2001, and 50 percent in 2002 and there a f t e r. For two-
parent families, the minimum participation rate must be 75 percent
in 1997 and 1998 and 90 percent in 1999 and thereafter.
• States must submit annual re p o rts to Congress detailing their
p ro g ress in increasing participation rates and in increasing employ-
ment and earnings for the needy. They must also explain how they
intend to increase child support payments and to decrease out-of-
wedlock pregnancies and child poverty.
States have flexibility in the following areas.
• States may reduce or terminate assistance to individuals and families
who refuse to work. However, they may not terminate assistance if
the recipient is a single custodial parent with children under 6 or if
the recipient has demonstrated that needed child care cannot be
found.
• States may reduce or deny assistance to those deemed to be uncoop-
erative in efforts to establish paternity.
Other features of the law include a ban on federal means-tested public
assistance to legal immigrants for a period of five years, with exceptions
for refugees and asylees. Legal immigrants are also ineligible for
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and food stamps until they attain
citizenship, although those who have worked for at least ten years may
be exempted from benefits restrictions. 
On the more positive side, the new law does offer increased Child Care
and Development Block Grants (CCDBG). These grants fund child care
services for low-income families and other activities intended to improve
A New Path from Welfare to Work
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an amendment to the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990,
states are required to spend their CCDBG allotments for activities aimed
at improving the quality of child care, increasing the availability of early
c h i l d h o od development programs, and providing before- and after-
school child care (G reen Book 1996, 649). The CCDBG pro g r a m
consists of a discre t i o n a ry program and a mandatory program. In 1996
funding was $935 million for the discretionary program and $1.1 billion
for the mandatory program. Under the new law, funding for the discre-
t i o n a ry program will be $1 billion each year between 1996 and 2002.
Funding for the mandatory program will begin at $2 billion in fiscal year
1997 and rise to a total of $13.85 billion for the entire period from 1997
to 2002. As with the temporary family assistance programs, the goal is to
allow states flexibility in developing child care programs and policies
that best meet the needs of children and families in their states. Another
goal is to promote parental choice so that parents will be able to make
decisions that best meet their family’s needs. In order to carry out these
objectives an additional $6 billion over six years will be appro p r i a t e d .
M o re o v e r, each state will be entitled to payments for the purpose of
providing child care assistance.
E ffects of the New We l f a re 
The key question re g a rding the new law is will it move recipients off
welfare and into the labor market more successfully than the old welfare
law. Under the 1988 Family Support Act, a Jobs Opportunities and Basic
Skills (JOBS) program complemented AFDC. The aim of the JOBS
program was to teach some basic job skills to those welfare mothers who
were required to participate. The new law essentially replaces AFDC and
its JOBS program with a hod g e p odge of state programs. To assess the
effects of the new law, two questions must be asked: What will be the
immediate impact of this legislation on both the welfare population and
the states that must now develop new programs for that population? Will
it be more successful in reducing the number of people in poverty than
the programs it has replaced?
Only time can give us accurate answers to both questions. Estimates vary
according to the imperative one attaches to welfare reform. Critics argue
The New We l f a re and the Potential for Wo r k f o rce Development
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p o v e rt y. The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities cites an Urban
Institute report that predicts that the new law will push 1.1 million chil-
d ren and 2.6 million people overall into poverty (Supor et al. 1996).
Results of states’ experiments with reform are bound to vary from state to
state, and the ultimate result is an unknown. It is clear that by transfer-
ring the major responsibility for welfare back to the states and by setting
the stage for subsequent reductions in welfare block grants, Congress has
found a way to cut federal spending. The Congressional Budget Off i c e
(CBO) estimates that federal spending will be reduced by $2.9 billion 
in FY 1997 and by $54.2 billion during the 1997 to 2002 period
(Congressional Budget Office 1996). What is not clear, however, is the
impact on overall spending. On the one hand, the states are required to
spend only 80 percent of what they were spending before. On the other
hand, some states may opt to spend more of their own money to cover
the costs of implementing this new welfare. In either case, support e r s
a rgue that it will enable state governments—who traditionally had
responsibility for implementation—to develop grass roots programs that
are better suited to their needs.
The Causes of Poverty and the Role of Work Pro g r a m s
Underlying the new welfare law is the assumption that many people are
on welfare because they had children out of wedlock and as teenagers.
This behavior pattern forces them to drop out of school and there f o re
they lack many of the skills necessary to obtain jobs paying above the
minimum wage. But this is not necessarily the cause of povert y, as
Congress seems to think. Indeed, there is no single cause (Blank 1997).
Research into the causes of poverty is divided into two partisan schools
of thought: economic and behavioral. The economic school arg u e s
essentially that people on welfare are poor because they lack the skills
necessary to obtain jobs that will lift them out of poverty and because
t h e re are an insufficient number of better-paying jobs. If we lived in a
s t ronger economy, in which more better-paying jobs were available,
t h e re would be fewer people living in povert y. Jobs do exist at the
bottom of the pay scale, but most people on welfare do not qualify for
anything better (Burtless 1995). Once people realize that they will not
A New Path from Welfare to Work
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for work (Blank 1997; Bane and Ellwood 1994; Murray 1984). The argu-
ment of the economic school is buttressed by studies demonstrating the
relationship between income and educational attainment (Murn a n e
1994; Card and Krueger 1992a, 1992b; Card and Sullivan 1988; Freeman
and Holzer 1986). It is further re i n f o rced by a literature illustrating a
widening gap in income distribution (Danziger and Gottschalk 1995;
Wolff 1994; Hungerford 1993; Levy 1988).
The behavioral school suggests that people are poor because of personal
defects. Jobs do exist and the primary reason people do not work is that
they have not been properly socialized into the work ethic. Furthermore,
had public assistance programs made it clear what was re q u i red of the
poor—such as work and other civic and communal re s p o n s i b i l i t i e s —
many of the pathologies plaguing the inner city that are commonly asso-
ciated with welfare might not exist (Banfield 1974; Mead 1986; Kaus
1992). The new law reflects a belief that those on welfare have different
behavioral traits than people in the mainstream middle class. It is
believed that the law will force people to be socialized by putting an end
to the permissive policies of the past.
If it is true that poverty in the United States is a self-perpetuating
culture reinforced by a set of permissive social policies, the new law may
very well improve the situation by forcing people to look for new means
of subsistence. But if poverty is a function of insufficient jobs, coupled
with a lack of educational attainment, it is hard to see how this law will
i m p rove the situation. Even some strong proponents of the behavioral
school maintain that the new law backs away from a true commitment
to work (Mead 1996). The demographics of the 1994 AFDC population
(see the appendix) would suggest that some aspects of both models have
c u rre n c y. At least 21 percent have less than a high school education,
and another 24 percent have no more than a high school education
(Green Book 1996, 473–474). In other words, a significant proportion of
w e l f a re mothers do not have a level of educational attainment that
would qualify them for jobs paying much more than minimum wage.
This statistic would imply the need for basic education programs. At the
same time, almost 46 percent have children under the age of 5. This
statistic would suggest that policy must seriously address the issue of
child care.
The New We l f a re and the Potential for Wo r k f o rce Development
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welfare mothers to move from welfare to work, it is not clear that it is
being addressed correctly. The law assumes that the child care problem
stems from the poverty of mothers, which stems from the failure of
fathers to pay their child support. Cert a i n l y, tough enforcement may
help some mothers to live above the poverty line, but it does not furnish
the facilities to watch children while mothers go out to work and, more
to the point, it may not produce any significant amount of money if
many fathers are unemployed or in low-wage jobs themselves.
States’ Experiments with Work Pro g r a m s
Whether the effects of the new welfare will be positive or negative for
welfare recipients depends on the states. Some states, such as Wisconsin,
Massachusetts, and Minnesota, had already begun re f o rming their
welfare systems under federal waiver. What is critical to these programs
is that these states no longer view them as welfare programs, but as
something totally different. Both Wisconsin and Massachusetts changed
the name of the Department of Welfare; it is now called the Department
of Workforce Development (DWD) in Wisconsin and the Department
of Transitional Assistance (DTA) in Massachusetts. Wisconsin has been
operating a waiver called Wisconsin Works W-2 since 1993. This work-
based program seeks to break the poverty culture of dependency by
requiring welfare recipients to work as a means of achieving self-
s u ff i c i e n c y, but it also offers the support services essential for making
work a viable option.
The W-2 program, and others like it, consists of four basic components:
unsubsidized employment, subsidized employment, community serv i c e
employment, and general participation. Under unsubsidized employ-
ment, efforts are made to steer those for whom it is possible into private
sector jobs. Job centers, in conjunction with private staffing agencies,
attempt to match program participants with employer needs. It is
assumed that most participants in the unsubsidized employment compo-
nent will be successful, with some assistance, in finding private sector
employment.
A New Path from Welfare to Work
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t h e re is subsidized employment. Subsidies are given to employers to
o ffset some of the initial costs of training and supervising new
employees. In Wisconsin the average subsidy for each participant in the
p rogram is $300 per month. In Massachusetts employers receive $3.50
per hour for each program participant for the first nine months and
$2.50 per hour for the next three months. An employer in Massachusetts
may not have more than 10 percent of his or her employees in subsidized
employment. In both Wisconsin and Massachusetts subsidized employ-
ment for each participant may not exceed 24 weeks. In Wisconsin it is
expected that subsidized employment will lead to permanent employ-
ment, but that expectation is not nearly as clear in Massachusetts.
For individuals who cannot be placed in either unsubsidized or subsidized
employment, because they need further development of work habits and
other skills to make them employable in the labor market, there is the
option of community service employment. In Wisconsin a participant is
placed in a work assignment lasting 6 to 9 months, but he or she can
qualify for more than one assignment for up to a maximum of 24
months. In Massachusetts community service participants must work a
minimum of 20 hours per week in exchange for benefits. 
For people who legitimately are unable to perf o rm independent, self-
sustaining work, even in a community service job, there is a general
participation program. In Wisconsin these are, for the most part, individ-
uals whose application for SSI is pending or individuals with mental or
physical disabilities. It is assumed that, whatever their situation or
d i s a b i l i t y, they do have some capabilities, and they are expected to
engage in some work activities consistent with those capabilities.
Work-based programs operate on the premise that individuals will move
up the ladder from community service employment to subsidized
employment to unsubsidized employment. Both the Wisconsin and
Massachusetts programs have intake processes to determine the specific
components of the programs recipients will participate in. For those in
the Massachusetts program a wide array of services is available, including
job readiness and job search. Participants are informed of job openings,
including those jobs available through the DTA’s Full Employment
The New We l f a re and the Potential for Wo r k f o rce Development
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P a rtnership Act (JTPA) Agencies, Regional Employment Board s
(REBs), and local businesses.
Massachusetts subjects those classified as “nonexempt” to a 2.75
p e rcent reduction in their cash assistance benefits, but they are
p e rmitted to retain more of their earned income. After having re c e i v e d
assistance for 60 days, nonexempt individuals are re q u i red to work a
minimum of 20 hours per week. In two-parent households, both pare n t s
a re subject to work re q u i rements, but only one parent is re q u i red to
work if children are of preschool age. Those placed in the Full
Employment Program must work 40 hours per week and no more .
Employers may not use them to displace regular employees or to
supplant vacancies previously established. Participants are to be paid a
minimum of $4.50 per hour. These wages are to be in lieu of assistance
under AFDC and food stamps. Also, for those participating in the Full
Employment Program, AFDC and the cash value of their food stamps
a re to be pooled and used to reimburse employers for a portion of the
wages they pay to part i c i p a n t s .
Minnesota launched its own waiver, called the Minnesota Family
Investment Program (MFIP), in April 1994. Like the other waivers,
MFIP was intended to promote employment, alleviate povert y, and
reduce dependence on public assistance as a primary source of income.
MFIP integrates several old welfare programs into a program that oper-
ates efficiently and makes work pay for families on welfare. This is
accomplished primarily by decreasing the extent to which families’
welfare grants are reduced when they work. MFIP also relieves partici-
pants of up-front costs of child care by paying the child care pro v i d e r
d i re c t l y. Instead of dealing with several programs, recipients deal with
only one bureaucracy, thereby increasing efficiency.
Both Wisconsin and Massachusetts have intake processes to make early
d e t e rminations of who will participate in work programs. MFIP deter-
mines exemption from participation by distinguishing between long-
t e rm and short - t e rm welfare recipients. Long-term recipients are
generally defined as those who have received assistance for at least 24
out of the last 36 months. This is similar to recent changes in the unem-
ployment insurance laws, which attempt to identify those most likely to
A New Path from Welfare to Work
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individuals who are less likely to find jobs without assistance and who
also account for a large share of welfare expenditures. They are required
to participate in intensive employment and training services. Single
parents who have received welfare for 24 out of the last 36 months and
t w o - p a rent families that have received welfare for 6 out of the last 12
months must participate.
In an assessment of this program, the Manpower Development Research
Corporation (MDRC) found that MFIP decreased the share of single-
p a rents receiving welfare by 4.3 percentage points and increased the
share of those who were officially combining work and welfare by 14.3
p e rcentage points. MFIP increased the share of recipients who were
either not on welfare or combining work and welfare by 10.1 percentage
points (Knox, Brown, and Lin 1995). 
Although there are differences among these programs, what they appear
to have in common is an attempt to break the poverty culture of depen-
dency through the creation of work programs. If every state adopted a
work program along these lines, the nation might be on its way toward
m o re complete and effective welfare re f o rm. On the other hand, the
p rograms also share a problem in their use of employer subsidies.
Although some of the programs offer technical training to the hard-core
unemployable, a major premise of all these efforts seems to be that what
these recipients need most, more than the acquisition of specific skills, is
the development of work habits. A second premise is that subsidies are a
n e c e s s a ry incentive for employers to hire them. Even if employers
cannot afford to retain them once the subsidies have run out, they will
nonetheless have developed the type of work habits that can make them
more attractive to other employers in the labor market. The new welfare
law assumes that because welfare recipients’ major handicap is their lack
of appropriate work habits, subsidies will gain them initial entry into the
labor market. However, even if recipients do acquire new skills and do
develop desirable work habits, it does not follow that there will be any
more jobs available to them at that point than there were in the past.
Work and training requirements and employer subsidies address only one
side of the unemployment issue, mainly, the supply of skilled labor. They
do not a d d ress the other side of the issue, the demand for labor
( M a rm o r, Mashaw, and Harvey 1990, 121).
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rolls into the labor market, it seems likely that more states will turn to
employer subsidies as one policy tool for accomplishing those ends.
Phelps (1994) has suggested that subsidies would be a good way of stimu-
lating demand for low-wage labor. Danziger and Gottschalk (1995) have
noted that lowering costs to employers would affect firms in two ways.
First, firms might find it more profitable to hire the subsidized, less-
skilled workers than the more skilled workers. Second, the reduction of
total costs might enable firms to expand their output. While the former
could be directly beneficial to the welfare population, the latter could
ultimately be beneficial to all groups, including the less-skilled workers. 
However, as Danziger and Gottschalk further argue, in order for subsidies
to be beneficial, two conditions have to be met: Firms have to be able to
substitute easily among diff e rent types of workers, and they must not
take the subsidy as an indication that the workers’ productivity is low.
Danziger and Gottschalk do not find evidence on past subsidies to
employers to be very promising. They note that when Congress passed
the Ta rget Jobs Tax Credit and the Youth Incentive Entitlement Pilot
P rojects, targeted at employers in the inner cities, there were few
employers willing to participate. They may have been unre s p o n s i v e
because they viewed the subsidy as an indication that these workers were
not good employees. Bishop (1989) found that participants in 
g o v e rn m e n t - s p o n s o red training programs were stigmatized and many
employers were not willing to take a chance on hiring them.
Whatever their drawbacks, subsidies might still be essential inducements
for employers to participate in the types of cooperative partnerships with
public officials that will be necessary to move recipients from welfare to
work. Given the high rate of turnover in the U.S. labor market, there is
little incentive for employers to offer on-the-job training (Fre e m a n
1994; Lynch 1994). Subsidies could be a good incentive for them to
provide it. The key is to tie subsidies for hiring to some type of on-the-
job training re q u i rement. Hence, not only would these new hirees be
socialized into “proper” work habits, they would acquire specific skills.
With subsidies solely for hiring, employers are likely to dismiss the
workers they hire once the subsidy ends, but if employers are required to
train the hirees, they would have more reason to retain them after the
subsidy has ended.
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The problem with relying on states to devise their own programs is that
there is no guarantee they will opt for one as ambitious as some of the
serious work-based programs already out there. On the contrary, given
the fiscal constraints in most states, it is more likely that they will
choose to do the minimum re q u i red under the law. The new law does
allow them wide discretion in denying people various kinds of assistance.
Even those states that opt for strong work-based plans might limit eligi-
bility for those components offering job training.
Work-based re f o rm similar to that described above would cost the nation
considerably more than it has been spending. The expected cost in
Wisconsin, for instance, for the fiscal year beginning in 1997 is $1.091
billion; $653 million is from federal bock grants, with the diff e re n c e
coming from state funds. In 1995 there were 72,366 AFDC cases in
Wisconsin. Spending the entire current budget on that caseload would
mean a cost per case of roughly $15,070. If the plan were implemented
nationwide, the cost for the total national caseload could be appro x i-
mately $72.6 billion.1 Even with the new law’s limits on benefits to legal
immigrants, the plan could still cost $67.5 billion.2 Under the old
w e l f a re, AFDC spending in 1995 was roughly $22 billion, of which 
$12 billion came from the federal government and $10 billion came fro m
the states (G reen Book 1996, 459). And the JOBS program was limited, as
it was capped at $1 billion. That means that the nation would be spending
$50 billion over what it was under the old welfare. It should be noted that
the nation was spending another $25 billion on food stamps and another
$25 billion still on the earned income tax credit (EITC). It is also impor-
tant to note that the Wisconsin program and others like it rely heavily on
wage subsidies from the EITC. There f o re, any future consideration of
EITC reductions could seriously undermine these re f o rm eff o rt s .
According to the CBO, the base level of the federal block grant is to be
fixed at $16.4 billion annually through 2002. States will essentially be
required to come up with the remainder. However, the new law requires
states to spend at a rate equal to only 80 percent of what they were
spending under the old law. Given that federal funding for cash assis-
tance is expected to be frozen for the next five years, it will be difficult
for states to maintain existing benefits in the event that poverty grows,
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sions for a Rainy Day Fund that would allow states to borrow during
recessionary periods, but it is doubtful that federal funds will be increased
to absorb those who otherwise would be covered under the old law.
States might find themselves in the position of having to choose
between using their own money to sustain welfare programs, restricting
entry, or cutting back benefits (Peterson 1996). 
In the short term we could expect to see states implementing portions of
this law on at least $2 billion less. The legislation does provide $14
billion for child care, as well as strict new child support enforc e m e n t
measures, and it is estimated that the stricter enforcement will raise an
additional $24 billion. If we assume the $24 billion will materialize and
add the resulting $38 billion ($14 billion plus $24 billion) to the $16.4
billion the federal government might continue to spend through block
grants, we would still be short about $18 billion of the $72.6 billion
needed to run a Wisconsin-type program on a national level. High-cost
states will most likely be hurt more than low-cost states. Moreover, states
with a history of low provision, such as Louisiana and Texas, may find
themselves with relatively greater shortfalls overall, because allocations
are based on a percentage of what states had been receiving under the
old welfare. It is precisely these states the nation must be concern e d
with. It has not been part of their political culture to provide assistance
to the poor or to experiment with work programs under federal waivers.
Therefore, they may be among the first to find ways to reduce their rolls.
One likely consequence is that although the new welfare allows for
greater experimentation by states, it will do nothing to end the dispari-
ties among the states that existed under the old system; rather it will
exacerbate them.
E ffects of Job Training Pro g r a m s
The new welfare seems to stress work and training re q u i rements, with
the subtext that poverty to a large extent is a function of insuff i c i e n t
education and skills. Yet, it is not at all clear that the new system has any
m o re of a commitment to developing skills through training pro g r a m s
than the old system. Instead, the emphasis appears to be on developing
“proper” work habits. The question remains as to just what lessons can
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Department of Labor (1995), it was noted that some types of programs
are indeed more successful than others.
As part of a study designed to explore the merits of worker profiling for
unemployment insurance recipients, New Jersey conducted a demonstra-
tion project  called  the  New  Jersey Unemployment Insurance
Reemployment Demonstration Project (NJUIRDP). The pro j e c t
involved three diff e rent treatments: job search assistance (JSA) only,
JSA combined with training or relocation assistance, and JSA combined
with cash bonuses for early reemployment. Overall, each tre a t m e n t
reduced the amount of unemployment insurance benefits received in the
initial benefit year and in subsequent years. Though a relatively small
number of claimants in the JSA plus training or relocation tre a t m e n t
received on-the-job training, those who did had significantly higher
e a rnings than did the assessed JSA-only claimants in all quart e r s
following the first quarter after the claim date. It was found that on-the-
job training had a substantial and statistically significant impact on earn-
ings and weeks worked throughout the six-year follow-up. On average, in
the first year those who received on-the-job training earned about $900
more and were employed 12 to 18 weeks more than those who did not
receive such training. By contrast, the JSA-only group did do better than
the control group, but not as well as the subgroup of the JSA combined
with training group that received on-the-job training. It was estimated
that the JSA-only group increased their earnings by an average of $608
relative to the control group. With another $128 in additional fringe
benefits, the total increase was equal to $736 in compensation (U.S.
Department of Labor 1995). Because welfare bureaucracies will be forced
to engage in serious profiling, a case could be made that a strong training
component in addition to profiling could be useful. At the same time,
however, it is not entirely clear that training programs by themselves are
the most cost-efficient means of achieving an objective.
In a study of Jobstart, one of the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA)
p rograms targeted at youths who were school dropouts, the Manpower
Development Research Corporation (MDRC) found the effects to be
mixed (Cave, Bos, Doolittle, and Toussant 1993). The Family Support
Act of 1988 had already increased educational services for young women
receiving AFDC. The 1992 amendments to the JTPA went further and
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required that those youth who were dropouts or had serious barriers to
employment be provided with increased educational services. The goal
of Jobstart was to increase participation in education and training activi-
ties by a group that otherwise would be little served. The goal of Jobstart
evaluation was to estimate the diff e rence that access to the pro g r a m
made for its target population. What the evaluation showed was that the
overall impact of Jobstart on earnings for a four-year period was a statisti-
cally insignificant gain of $214, or 1.3 percent, over what part i c i p a n t s
would have earned had they not had access to the program. Those in the
experimental group earned on average $17,010 per year, while those in
the control group earned on average $16,796.
At the same time, there were diff e rential impacts on diff e rent gro u p s .
C u s t odial mothers in the experimental group, for instance, had a gain of
$625, or 7.5 percent, over their control gro u p ’s mean of $8,334. Other
women in the experimental group had a smaller gain—$613, or 4.6
p e rcent, of their control gro u p ’s mean of $13,310. For men, however,
t h e re was actually a loss. Men lost $273, or 1.2 percent, of their contro l
g ro u p ’s mean of $23,637. This has to be weighed against the average cost
per member of the experimental group in delivering Jobstart serv i c e s —
including intake, education, training, job placement assistance, coun-
seling, and life skills workshops—which ran from $4,000 to $5,500,
depending on the site. In New York City, for instance, the average cost
ran as high as $7,500 (Cave, Bos, Doolittle, and Toussant 1993).
Wo r k f o rce Development Policies
The AFDC system, in its initial design, reflected a societal norm of the
time—that mothers with small children should remain at home (Te l e s
1996; Gordon 1994). The norm, however, has changed, and it is now
demanded that they work. Therefore, it is perhaps time to end the artifi-
cial distinction between employment policy and welfare policy. Instead
of increasing funding for existing programs, more money ought to be
a p p ropriated for transitional services such as education and training.
Despite the mixed results of job training, it is still going to be useful for
some people. Therefore, ways should be sought to coordinate existing job
training programs with the new eff o rts to assist the poor. If such a
A New Path from Welfare to Work
Public Policy Brief 24
PPB No.31  2/17/99  4:41 PM  Page 24streamlined plan were implemented correctly, states would essentially be
embarking on more comprehensive employment programs. The key
would be to add greater unity and coherence to the welfare and work
programs. Also, given that the new welfare is no less regulatory than the
old, it might not be unreasonable to require that all states model their
programs along the lines of the three work-based plans described in this
brief. States might even be offered bonuses for doing so sooner. The only
apparent obstacle, then, would be coming up with the funds to pay for
the plans. But given the recent reform of the unemployment insurance
(UI) system, with the Unemployment Compensation Amendments of
1993, this task may not be as complicated as it seems. 
The unemployment insurance amendments established a system
w h e reby individuals, upon filing for UI benefits, are profiled according 
to demographic and occupational characteristics. The goal is to iden-
tify those likely to be unemployed for long periods. Those so identified
a re targeted for job search assistance. In an earlier brief (Levin-
Waldman 1996a), I argued that the UI system could be re f o rmed to be
the basis of a system through which the long-term unemployed re c e i v e
training in order to meet the new demands of the labor market. 
This training could be provided by offering vouchers to employers for
on-the-job training. The vouchers would in part be funded out of the
UI benefits the long-term unemployed would have received. The use of
vouchers seems to be a logical implication of findings that employer-
based training is perhaps more effective than program training, because
it is specifically geared toward employers’ needs (Lynch 1994).
If we could end the welfare-unemployment distinction and simply offer
training vouchers to workers, the welfare stigma would no longer exist.
C u rrent welfare recipients might then have an easier time finding
employment. Therefore, it would seem logical to look to the current UI
system for the re s o u rces necessary to implement more compre h e n s i v e
employment programs. More o v e r, as the new welfare appears to point
t o w a rd a path of workforce development, several policies ought to be
considered for improving the new law. At a minimum, the new welfare
law ought to require that all states provide job search assistance. In the
end, this could prove to be more effective than simple workfare. A truly
streamlined welfare-work bureaucracy would ultimately give substance to
the Employment Act of 1946, the objective of which was to ensure that
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the future ought to be predicated on the notion that people need to
work and that the goal of public policy is to provide opport u n i t y, not
entitlement. If new institutional structures can be created that will end
the stigma associated with traditional assistance, they will ultimately
achieve greater middle-class acceptance (Gans 1995). Improvements to
the new welfare would include the following.
• Existing welfare bureaucracies would be merged with employment
bureaucracies to offer more efficient delivery of employment services.
The welfare state would no longer be characterized by public assis-
tance programs, but by comprehensive employment services.
• Unemployment offices would no longer distinguish between those
who were recently laid off and those who have been on welfare. Each
applicant would be evaluated on the basis of what services he or she
needs in order to obtain employment.
• P rofiling would be used to identify those most likely to have the
g reatest difficulty in obtaining work. Those so identified would be
targeted for education and training programs.
• States would, at a minimum, provide job search assistance.
• Subsidies would be made available to employers to hire welfare 
recipients, but the subsidies would be tied to on-the-job training
re q u i rements. This would enable employers to train workers
according to their firm-specific needs.
• Those identified as most likely to need comprehensive employment
s e rvices would be among the first to be selected for an employer-
based voucher program, which offers vouchers to employers to hire
and train workers.
Efforts to improve the new welfare would involve streamlining existing
programs and ultimately creating new institutional structures. Congress,
to some extent, has begun this process with its recent passage of the
Wo r k f o rce Development Act. The act essentially consolidates more
than 100 federally funded training programs, administered by 15
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c reates a new stru c t u re for their funding, principally through block
grants. The idea behind this law was to make the United States more
competitive globally by eliminating the fragmentation inherent in the
old training system and creating “coherent, integrated statewide work-
force development systems designed to develop more fully the academic,
occupational, and literacy skills of all segments of the workforce.”
Consolidated workforce development works in much the same way as
the new welfare. States submit to a national governing board their plans
for providing many of the same types of services that are to be provided
under the new welfare and the unemployment insurance re f o rms of
1993. Just as they must do with the new welfare, states are required to
offer a core set of services that at a minimum include outreach, intake,
and orientation to whatever information and services are available
t h rough one-stop career centers; initial assessment of skill levels, apti-
tudes, abilities, and supportive service needs; job search assistance,
placement assistance, and career counseling if appropriate; screening and
referral of qualified applicants to employment; and the provision of accu-
rate information relating to local labor market conditions.
U l t i m a t e l y, whatever it is called, workforce development involves
emphasis on training. And to the extent that welfare recipients will,
under the new welfare, be re q u i red to participate in education and
training programs, the new welfare effectively moves in the same direc-
tion. Just as the new welfare returns welfare policy to the states under a
u n i f o rm set of federal regulations, so, too, does the Wo r k f o rc e
Development Act. The question is, however, why are workforce devel-
opment, welfare reform, and unemployment insurance operated as sepa-
rate entities. If the goal of the new welfare policy is to end dependency
and foster a greater work ethic, then it needs to be tied more closely with
existing policy aimed at developing the workforce. Not only would this
lead to greater efficiency in the delivery of public services, but it would
also end the stigma now attached to welfare. Instead of viewing the new
system as welfare policy with new flexibility, we should look at it as an
o p p o rtunity to end the artificial distinction between unemployment
insurance and welfare. The reason for the initial bifurcation was to
generate political support for a set of measures that were anomalous
h i s t o r i c a l l y. The public was willing to support Social Security because
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worked to obtain it (We i r, Orloff, and Skocpol 1988). But the public
now supports work for welfare recipients, and it makes no sense to
continue the stigma attached to welfare. With the new welfare in place,
o p p o rtunity to improve on it may finally present the nation with an
opportunity to create a more comprehensive employment program that
would replace outmoded public assistance. But for this to occur, a new
institutional stru c t u re is essential. This can involve no less than
b reaking down bureaucratic distinctions between those programs tradi-
tionally regarded as welfare and those programs traditionally regarded as
employment. The goal is to enable people to work.
Appendix. Demographics of the 1994 AFDC Population
Average family size (persons) 2.8




Four or more 9.6
Unknown 2.1 
Basis for eligibility  Percent of children
Parents present in household
Parent incapacitated 4.9 
Parent unemployed 8.7
Parents absent from household
Death 1.7
Divorce or separation 26.5
No marriage tie 55.7
Other reason 2.0
Unknown 1.4 
Education of mother  Percent of mothers
Eighth grade or less 4.0
One to three years of high school 17.6
High school diploma 24.1 
Some college 7.7 
College graduate .5
Unknown 46.0
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Under 20 years 6.3
20 to 24 years 24.6
25 to 29 years 22.6
30 to 39 years 34.9
40 years or over 1.5
Unknown                                                                —
Age of children  Percent of recipient children
Under 3 years 23.8
3 to 5 years 22.1
6 to 11 years 31.7
12 years and over 22.2
Unknown 0.3 
Employment status of mother Percent of mothers
Full-time job 3.3
Part-time job 4.6
Presence of income  Percent of families
With earnings 8.9
No non-AFDC income  77.5
Median months on AFDC since most 
recent opening 22.8






Other or unknown 2.1
Incidence of households  Percent
Living in public housing 8.3
Participating in food stamps 
or donated food program  88.6
Including nonrecipient members  46.4





S o u rce: F ro m G reen Book ( Washington, D.C.: U.S. House Ways and Means Committee,
1996), 473–474.
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1.  This figure is derived by multiplying the cost per case by the national case-
load, which, according to unpublished tables by the Administration for
C h i l d ren and Families in the Department of Health and Human Serv i c e s ,
was 4.818 million. The figure re p resents an average. It does not take into
account cost-of-living disparities or costs associated with addre s s i n g
entrenched social pathologies. Therefore, $15,070 per case might overstate
the cost in places like Arkansas and Mississippi, but understate them in
places like New York and California.
2.  This is based on a personal communication with a staff member of the House
Ways and Means Committee that indicated that legal immigrants accounted
for only 7 percent of the old AFDC caseload.
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